**Online Appendix for “MAD and Taboo: U.S. Expert Views on Nuclear Deterrence, Coercion, and Non-Use Norms”**

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This Appendix provides supporting material and analysis for the article “MAD and Taboo: U.S. Expert Views on Nuclear Deterrence, Coercion, and Non-Use Norms.” Part One displays the full survey questions for national security policymakers and international relations (IR) faculty. Part Two discusses how I calculated the size of the response pool and presents the National Security Policymaker pool overview. Part Three presents additional data for views on nuclear deterrence and coercion by sex, race, and political ideology. Part Four reports results for policymaker and faculty demographic characteristics on views of the nuclear taboo.

**Part One: Survey Questions**

Respondents answered the questions online by checking a response option. There were no open-ended response options. The surveys included a number of non-nuclear questions before and after the specific nuclear questions, and policymakers could skip questions. As noted in the article, policymakers were first screened by their familiarity with the underlying theories. They also received an additional question with a definition for MAD that IR faculty did not. The wording for the nuclear deterrence, coercion, and taboo questions was thus slightly different to reflect the different lead-ins. The response options were the same for both groups. In addition to the discussion on country selection for the nuclear taboo discussed in the article, during pre-survey workshops several former policymakers stated that asking about U.S. nuclear use would lower response rates. This also informed the decision not to include the United States, as well as Israel, as country options for policymakers.

*National Security Policymaker Survey*

Note: Respondents were randomly assigned the order in which they received the “Are you familiar with” Mutual Assured Destruction and Nuclear Taboo questions.

Mutual Assured Destruction:

1. Are you familiar the theory of “mutual assured destruction”? (Yes or No)

If yes, respondents answered questions 2-4. If no, respondents proceeded to the next question in the survey.

1. How confident are you that the theory of “mutual assured destruction” is correct – that when two countries have an assured second strike capability the likelihood of conflict between them decreases? Are you… (Very confident, Somewhat confident; Not very confident, Not confident at all; Don’t know)
2. More generally, how confident are you that a state that has an assured second strike capability can achieve the following foreign policy goals?

Respondents received each of the following descriptions on the same screen and rated how confident they were for each (Very confident; Somewhat confident; Not very confident; Not confident at all; Don’t know)

* 1. Deter nuclear attacks by another state
  2. Coerce states that have nuclear weapons to change their behavior
  3. Deter conventional attacks by another nuclear armed state
  4. Coerce states without nuclear weapons to change their behavior
  5. Deter conventional attacks by a state without nuclear weapons

Nuclear Taboo:

1. Are you familiar with the “nuclear taboo” thesis? (Yes or No)

If yes, respondents answered questions 2-3. If no, respondents proceeded to the next question in the survey.

1. How confident are you that the “nuclear taboo” – domestic and international norms against using nuclear weapons – constrains countries such as [Randomly assign: Russia and China OR United Kingdom and France] from using nuclear weapons in a first strike? Are you … (Very confident, Somewhat confident; Not very confident, Not confident at all; Don’t know)

*International Relations Faculty Survey*

There were no initial familiarity questions for IR faculty respondents. Each received the following two questions.

Mutual Assured Destruction

How confident are you that a state that has an assured second strike capability can achieve the following foreign policy goals?

As with the National Security Policymakers, Respondents received each of the following descriptions on the same screen and rated how confident they were for each (Very confident; Somewhat confident; Not very confident; Not confident at all; Don’t know)

1. Deter nuclear attacks by another state
2. Coerce states that have nuclear weapons to change their behavior
3. Deter conventional attacks by another nuclear armed state
4. Coerce states without nuclear weapons to change their behavior
5. Deter conventional attacks by a state without nuclear weapons
6. How confident are you that the “nuclear taboo”—domestic and international norms against using nuclear weapons—constrains countries such as [Randomly assign: Russia and China OR United Kingdom and France OR the United States] from using nuclear weapons in a first strike? Are you... (Very confident, Somewhat confident; Not very confident, Not confident at all; Don’t know)

**Part Two: National Security Policymaker Survey Pool Overview**

The number of potential respondents in the national security policymaker survey is up to but 1,689 individuals. The national security policymaker survey was conducted at the same time as two others that surveyed Trade and Development policymakers. 206 respondents were from offices with substantial overlap across security, trade, and development (e.g., Trade Security Policy in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy)). These individuals could select to complete the survey they viewed as most appropriate. Twenty-six selected trade and development and nine selected security. It is impossible to know, however, how many of the remaining 171 would have identified as security. I therefore use a conservative estimate that all 171 would have identified as national security officials to generate a maximum response pool and report a response rate of 19% (320 out of 1,689). In reality, the response rate for national security policymakers was likely somewhat higher because not all 171 potential respondents that could have opted into one of the three pools would have self-identified as national security officials (instead identifying as Trade or Development policymakers).

The remainder of this section provides an overview of the positions identified. It is not comprehensive because the names and numbers of specific positions evolve or move. Additionally, in some years the specific position was vacant or contact information for the individual holding that position could not be found.

* Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1993-1998)
  + Director and Deputy Director
  + Assistant and Deputy Assistant Directors (e.g. Strategic and Eurasian Affairs; Intelligence, Verification, and Information Support; Strategic and Nuclear Affairs)
  + Division Chiefs (e.g., International Security and Nuclear Policy; Chemical and Biological Policy)
  + Special Representatives (e.g., Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Matters)
* Central Intelligence Agency (1993-2016)
  + Director, Deputy, and Executive Director(s)
  + Directorate Director and Deputy Directors (e.g., Intelligence, Operations / National Clandestine Services, Science and Technology)
* Department of Defense (1993-2016)
  + Secretary and Deputy Secretary
  + Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
    - Undersecretary, Deputy and Principal Deputy Undersecretary
    - Assistant, Principal Deputy Assistant, and Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Principal Directors and Directors (e.g., International Security Policy – European and NATO Policy – NATO Policy)
    - Director and Deputy Director Net Assessment
  + Intelligence Components
    - Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretary for Intelligence
    - Directors and Deputy Directors (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency)
  + Service Departments (Air Force, Army, Navy including Marines Corps)
    - Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries
    - Uniformed Chiefs (see also Joint Chiefs of Staff)
    - Directors (or equivalent) of Intelligence and Plans Components
  + Joint Chiefs of Staff (including Chairman and Vice Chairman)
  + Joint Staff
    - Director and Vice Director
    - Directors J2, J3, J5, J7
  + Combatant Commanders (e.g., CENTCOM, STRATCOM, etc.)
* Department of Homeland Security (2003-2016)
  + Secretary and Deputy Secretary
  + Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretaries for National Protection and Programs and Office of Intelligence and Analysis
  + Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Directors (e.g., Cybersecurity and Communications – National Cyber Security Division; Policy – Office of International Affairs)
  + Coast Guard (Commandant and Vice Commandant)
* Department of State (1993-2016)
  + Secretary and Deputy Secretary
  + Policy Planning Staff (Director and members)
  + Ambassador to the United Nations
  + Counselor, Ambassadors-at-Large, and Special Representatives (e.g., War Crimes Issues, Global Humanitarian Demining)
  + Undersecretaries and Deputy Undersecretaries (e.g., Arms Control and International Security; Democracy and Global Affairs; Political Affairs)
  + Assistant, Principal Deputy, and Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Directors (e.g., Arms Control, Verification and Compliance – Nuclear and Strategic Policy – Multilateral and Nuclear Affairs)
* Federal Bureau of Investigation (Department of Justice)
  + Director
  + Executive Assistant and Associate Executive Assistance and Assistant and Deputy Assistant Directors National Security Branch (e.g., Counterterrorism Division, Intelligence, Weapons of Mass Destruction)
* Homeland Security Office / Council (2002 – 2009)
  + Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
  + Special Assistants, Senior Directors, Directors, and Associate Directors (e.g., Cyber Infrastructure Program, Nuclear Defense Policy)
* National Security Council (1993-2016)
  + Assistant and Deputy Assistant(s) to the President for National Security Affairs
  + Special Assistants and Directors (e.g., African Affairs, Nonproliferation and Export Controls
* Office of the Director for National Intelligence (2005-2016)
  + Director and Deputy Director
  + Directors and Deputy Directors Centers and Executives (e.g., National Counterterrorism Center; National Counterproliferation Center; National Counterintelligence Executive)
  + Director and Officers National Intelligence Council (e.g., Africa, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation)
* Office of the Vice President (1993-2016)
  + Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
  + Deputy and Special Advisors to the Vice President
* Respondents in the following could opt-in to Security or Development or Trade:
  + US Institute of Peace (Security & Dev)
  + Department of Defense (Security & Trade)
    - Trade and Security Policy (in OUSD(Policy))

**Part Three: Views on Nuclear Deterrence and Coercion by Race and Sex**

Figures A.1 to A.6 display breakdowns along the three demographic groups discussed in the main text of the article. The article utilizes ordered logit models (excluding Don’t Know responses) to estimate the effect of these and other demographic characteristics on confidence in nuclear deterrence and coercion. I focus on the role of sex and race because they had the most noticeable effects in the models in the article. I include the results for ideology because past studies have found strong links to ideology or partisanship and various views on nuclear weapons.[[1]](#footnote-1) The ordered logit models found no consistent direction or statistically significant effects, however.

Note that the figures include the breakdowns for each response option which is necessary to discuss the strength of responses doubting the efficacy of nuclear weapons. By contrast, the article reports only very and somewhat confident for simplicity.





For policymakers, men and women shared similar views. Male policymakers were more likely to express higher levels of confidence than women that nuclear weapons deter nuclear strikes when controlling for other characteristics. But a large majority of women were very or somewhat confident as well (86%). The other statistically significant result from the model reported in the article (Table 4) was women were more likely to say nuclear weapons could coerce nonnuclear opponents. Figure A.2 shows that fully half said they were somewhat confident (not a single female respondent said they were very confident). For men only 32% were very or somewhat confident.

The influence of sex was more marked for IR faculty (Table 5 in the article). Overall, majorities of men and women were very or somewhat confident that nuclear weapons deterred but did not coerce. The largest substantive difference in response was the percentage of men (53%) reporting very high confidence that nuclear weapons deterred nuclear strikes relative to women (30%). While similar percentages of men and women said they were very or somewhat confident nuclear weapons coerced nuclear opponents, the percentage of women that said they were not confident at all was lower (26%) than their male colleagues (36%). 



For race, the models in the article found a statistically significant effect for IR faculty for both nuclear coercion options. That difference is visually noticeable in the percentages for Figure A.4. The picture is somewhat muddier for deterrence against conventional attacks. Based on the model from the article, the odds of expressing higher levels of confidence in deterring attacks by nonnuclear states are higher for minority than white respondents. Yet the basic percentages for minority respondents reporting they are somewhat confident (37%) and not very confident (24%) is similar to white respondents (41% and 21%, respectively). The differences were larger at the two ends of the response options. For minority respondents 28% said they were very confident and 6% said they were not confident at all that nuclear weapons deterred conventional attacks by nonnuclear opponents. The corresponding percentages for their white colleagues were 22% and 13%. The models in the article found no statistically significant effects for race among national security policymakers when controlling for other characteristics.





To measure ideology, the survey asked respondents: Which of the following best describes your positions generally on economic issues? Respondents could choose among five options: very liberal; somewhat liberal; moderate; somewhat conservative; very conservative. Figures A.5 and A.6 collapse the two liberal and two conservative options together alongside the moderate category to create three groups. Conservatives slightly outnumbered liberals among policymakers while there was a sizeable liberal majority among IR faculty (see Tables 2 and 3 in the article).

The results for national security policymakers (figure A.5) show no clear pattern and small differences between the different groups. There was more variation among IR faculty (A.6). The largest difference was on the utility of secure-second strike arsenals to compel nonnuclear opponents. The percentage of conservative respondents expressing they were very confident in this effect was nearly double their liberal and moderate colleagues (though similar percentages were somewhat confident across each group). This is not surprising, but the differences were not significant when controlling for other factors in the main article. The results may also be influenced by the small number of conservative (and moderate) respondents relative to liberal IR faculty.

**Part Four: Policymaker and IR Faculty Views on the Nuclear Taboo**

Table A.1 reports results for policymaker demographic characteristics on views of the nuclear taboo discussed in the main article. That discussion highlighted the role of education on increasing the likelihood of reporting familiarity with the nuclear taboo. In addition, 54 of 67 (81%) of respondents that held a university/college affiliation and PhD were familiar with the nuclear taboo, compared to 123 of 253 (49%) of the remaining respondents. Table A.2 reports the results for IR faculty. For IR faculty, men are slightly more likely to express confidence that nuclear non-use norms constrain the United States than women. No other characteristics were statistically significant.





1. Ideology and partisanship are related but discrete. The survey did not ask respondent partisanship. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)